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Abstract  
Spillovers can arise when multinational firms (MNEs) train local employees who 
later join domestic firms, bringing with them part of the technological, marketing 
and managerial knowledge they have acquired. Fosfuri et al. (2001) suggest that 
the direction and the intensity of the worker mobility, and its associated 
spillovers, are affected by the degree of product market competition. In this 
paper, we assess empirically the importance of this hypothesis for the first time 
by using the Finnish longitudinal employeer-employee data. We first quantify the 
importance of spillovers via worker mobility by estimating augmented 
production functions. Second, we analyse the impact of product market 
competition and absorptive capacity on worker mobility by estimating several 
competing risks models. We find that productivity spillovers arise only when 
workers move from MNEs to purely domestic firms in high-tech industries. 
Further, in line with predictions of Fosfuri et al, our results show that competition 
reduces worker mobility. This details a channel through which competition may 
affect total factor productivity of purely domestic plants adversely. 
 
Key words: spillovers, labour mobility, product-market competition, linked 
employer-employee data 
 
JEL classification numbers: D22, D24, F23, J62 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tuottavuuden ulkoisia sivuvaikutuksia voi syntyä, kun työntekijät siirtyvät 
monikansallisista yrityksistä paikallisten yritysten palvelukseen ja tuovat 
mukanaan osan edellisen työnantajan teknologia-, markkinointi- ja 
johtamisosaamisesta. Fosfuri et al. (2001) teoreettinen malli osoittaa, että 
tuotemarkkinakilpailu vaikuttaa työntekijöiden liikkuvuuden suuntaan ja 
intensiteettiin sekä siitä syntyviin sivuvaikutuksiin. Tutkimuksemme on 
ensimmäinen, jossa arvioidaan empiirisesti hypoteesin merkittävyyttä käyttäen 
  
 
suomalaista pitkittäistä työnantaja-työntekijä aineistoa. Ensiksi määritämme 
työtekijöiden liikkuvuudesta syntyvien ulkoisten sivuvaikutusten tärkeyttä 
estimoimalla laajennettuja tuottavuusfunktioita. Toiseksi analysoimme 
tuotemarkkinakilpailun ja absorptiokapasiteetin vaikutusta työntekijöiden 
liikkuvuuteen estimoimalla useita ”competing risk” -malleja. Tuloksemme 
osoittavat, että tuottavuuden sivuvaikutuksia syntyy ainoistaan silloin, kun 
työntekijöitä siirtyy monikansallisista yrityksistä paikallisiin yrityksiin 
korkeateknologia-aloilla. Lisäksi Fosfuri et al. ennusteiden mukaisesti tulok-
semme osoittavat, että kilpailu vähentää työntekijöiden liikkuvuutta. Täten 
kilpailu voi vaikuttaa paikallisten yritysten tuottavuuteen haitallisesti. 
 
Asiasanat: tuottavuuden ulkoiset sivuvaikutukset, työvoiman liikkuvuus, 
tuotekilpailu, yhdistetty työnantaja-työntekijä aineisto 
 
JEL-luokittelu: D22, D24, F23, J62 
 
1 Introduction
The entry of multinational rms and inward foreign direct investments are believed
to bring productivity improvements in the domestic economy. Multinationals tend to
have some competitive advantage based on superior technology or other rm-specic
knowledge, and part of this knowledge is believed to spill over and to improve the pro-
ductivity of the domestic rms. One channel for the spillover e¤ects is worker mobility.
Positive spillover e¤ects may arise as former employees of MNEs join domestic rms
and bring with them the technological, marketing and managerial knowledge that they
have acquired (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). However, at the same time, the entry of
multinationals in a given domestic market potentially changes the nature of competition
in the industry which, in turn, may also bring about productivity improvements.
The existence of these two e¤ects has been recognized theoretically by Fosfuri et al.
(2001). They develop a simple and very instructive two-period oligopoly model. The
model predicts that the degree of competition is likely to play an important role in the
occurrence of technology spillovers since it a¤ects di¤erently the incentives of multina-
tional and local rms to keep and to hire workers. However, the link between the degree
of product competition and the extent of technology spillovers from multinationals to
domestic rms has "rarely been explored in the literature as it raises complex method-
ological problems", as stated by Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). In their view,
it is very di¢ cult to disentangle empirically the two e¤ects on, e.g. the total factor
productivity (TFP) of local rms. A potential solution to this problem, which has not
been explored so far, is to look into the e¤ect of product market competition on ob-
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servables proxying for technology spillovers more directly, as opposed to more standard
output measures such as rm TFP. In this paper, we adopt the approach of estimating
the e¤ects of worker mobility on rm TFP to empirically disentangle spillover e¤ects
and competition e¤ects of the MNE impact.
Our paper departs from a theoretical formalization of spillovers by Fosfuri et al.
(2001).1 In the rst period, a multinational rm provides training to a local worker and
gains monopoly prots by using a superior technology. If the multinational keeps the
trained worker in the second period, it also keeps gaining monopoly prots. However,
in the second period the multinational rm faces competition from a local rm which
realizes that it could also gain access to the technology by hiring the trained worker.
If the latter is willing to pay a higher salary in order to hire the worker, it will enter
the market and compete with the multinational rm. Clearly, the incentive for the
multinational to keep the worker, by o¤ering better conditions than the local rm,
depends on the toughness of competition in the second period. In particular, worker
mobility and technological spillovers are more likely to materialize and therefore the
monopoly ceases to existonly when the joint prot e¤ect does not hold, that is,
when the sum of the gross prots of two duopolists using the technology is larger than
1Albeit not directly focusing on the role played by product market competion, Glass and Saggi
(2002) also develop a theoretical model along similar lines. Their main conclusions can be summarized
as follow. Firstly, the MNE has the incentive to prevent workersmobility only when technology transfer
is incomplete since the required wage premium would be larger - the more complete is technology
transfer. Secondly, and possibly more interestingly, the presence of multiple MNEs increases the
likelihood of workersmobility whereas the presence of multiple local rms decreases it. The intuition
for this second result is obvious. The incentive to prevent technology transfers is weakened by the
presence of multiple MNEs since each of them has the incentive not to o¤er a wage premium presuming
that all other foreign subsidiaries will do so. On the other hand, with many local rms competing in
the same market, the benet of restricting technology transfers is large since the MNE can increase
the cost of all local competitors by paying the wage premium.
2
the gross prot of a monopolist. This is more likely to happen when the local and the
multinational rm do not compete ercely in the product market or sell in independent
or vertically related markets. Fosfuri et al. (2001) also note that the extent to which
technological spillovers occur depends on the nature of the technology and how easily
it can be transferred. The model predicts higher labor mobility and more technological
spillovers when the absorptive capacity of the local rm is su¢ ciently high and when
on-the-job training is general rather than specic.
Our contribution to the literature on this issue is twofold. First, to the best our
knowledge, we are rst to analyze how worker mobility as a mechanism of technology
di¤usion responds both to the degree of competition in the product market and to the
absorptive capacity of the local rms. As noted by Fosfuri et al. (2001), testing their
predictions requires very disaggregated data, which explains why at the time of publi-
cation of their paper they claimed, and rightly so, that "this analysis has not been un-
dertaken". To reach our goals, we exploit the availability of a large employer-employee
panel data-set from Finland (FLEED) for 1990-2006. The possibility of following work-
ers over time opens a completely new research dimension since we can model the mo-
bility patterns from multinationals to local rms in a multivariate duration framework
and test the hypotheses of interest in a rigorous way. Second, we provide additional
evidence on the economic importance of productivity spillovers and when they arise.
This allows us to test whether the transmission mechanism we are analyzing is indeed
present in our data.
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, productivity spillovers
through worker mobility exist but are not economy-wide. Distinguishing between high-
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and low-tech industries by R&D expenditure, we nd productivity spillovers, that are
both economically large and statistically signicant, only for high-tech industries. This
is consistent with the transfer of technological knowledge through worker mobility. Ac-
cording to our estimates, workers with former multinational experience are 37 percent
more productive than their colleagues without such an experience. Second, and in line
with the predictions put forward by Fosfuri et al., a less competitive environment seems
to be conductive to technology spillovers through worker mobility. Workers are more
likely to move from multinational to non-multinational rms when the rms operate in
a less competitive industry with higher price cost margins, or when the sending multi-
national rm and the receiving domestic rm operate in di¤erent industries. However,
we nd that competition inhibits worker mobility only in industries with productivity
spillovers and has the opposite e¤ect on transitions and in industries where spillover
e¤ects are absent. In addition, we nd that the absorptive capacity of the local rm,
measured in terms of productivity gap between the local and the multinational rms
within the same industry, a¤ects the potential for spillovers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we briey review
the recent scant empirical literature on the relationship between worker mobility and
productivity. Section 3 describes our data sets and provides descriptive evidence on
several aspects of worker mobility. In Section 4 we present our empirical analysis, rst
the model and the results for quantifying the productivity spillovers and thereafter the
econometric framework and the results for worker mobility. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Related Empirical Literature
In the last decade, the increased availability of linked employer-employee data-sets
has allowed researchers to start opening the black box of technology spillovers and, in
particular, to study the relevance of the worker mobility channel much more precisely.
In fact, data availability has made it possible to build plant (or rm) specic measures
quantifying the impact of the workers with previous experience from multinationals.
These measures have been used in augmented productivity equations as a replacement
for the standard, and far less accurate, proxy used in the older literature based on the
share of output produced by multinationals operating in the same industry and/or in
the same geographical area.
So far, previous empirical research has focused on the spillover e¤ects without taking
into account the possible simultaneous competition e¤ects. Studies by Balsvik (2011)
and Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) have found positive rm-level productivity e¤ects
through employer mobility by using comprehensive employer-employee data sets respec-
tively for Norway and Denmark. Balsvik provides a number of complementary pieces
of empirical evidence which are broadly consistent with the existence of a channel for
technology spillovers through worker mobility. She nds a large productivity di¤erential
(20 percent) in local plants between workers with MNE experience and their colleagues
without such experience, even after controlling for unobserved characteristics of the
workers. Coupled with the nding of a 5 percent premium for movers from MNEs to
domestic plants, when compared to stayers in local plants with similar characteristics,
she concludes that local rms do not fully pay for the value of the workers to the rm
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and thus worker mobility fromMNEs to non-MNEs is found to be a source of knowledge
externality in Norwegian manufacturing.
Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) nd that hiring workers from more productive rms
is associated with gains amounting to a 0.35 percent productivity increase one year
after hiring for the average rm. This increase in productivity lasts four years and the
associated cumulative gain for four consecutive years is 1.64 percent which is equivalent
to a 2.3 centile move up in the productivity distribution by the median rm in Danish
manufacturing. On a related issue, Gorg and Strobl (2005) exploit rm-level data from
Ghana with information on whether entrepreneurs were former employees of MNEs.
Their overall analysis provides evidence that domestic rms run by entrepreneurs with
experience from working for multinationals in the same industry are more productive
and more likely to survive than other rms. There are also a number of studies specif-
ically focusing on R&D spillovers. These include Maliranta et al. (2009) and Kaiser et
al. (2011) who nd that the hiring of workers from R&D intensive or innovative rms
is associated with better performance by hiring rms.
Other relevant studies include Poole (2013) and Pesola (2007) who focus on workers
and wages rather than on rms/plants and productivity. Poole (2013) nds evidence for
positive wage spillovers by using Brazilian data. When workers leave multinationals and
are rehired at domestic establishments, continuing domestic workerswages increase.
She also investigates where spillovers occur and how they are absorbed and nds that
higher-skilled former multinational workers are better able to transfer information and
higher-skilled incumbent domestic workers are better able to absorb information. Pesola
(2007) analyzes the extent to which employees benet from the knowledge they acquire
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in foreign-owned rms when moving to domestic rms and, in particular, whether this
rent is associated to their educational level. She exploits a sample of the total Finnish
linked employer-employee data set that we use. Her main nding suggests that previous
tenure in a foreign rm has a positive e¤ect on wages but only for workers located at
the top of the distribution of educational levels. These results are consistent with the
idea that domestic rms may want to pay higher wages to workers with multinational
experience in order to gain access to their knowledge.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
We use data from four di¤erent databases from Statistics Finland for the years 1990
to 2006. The main database is the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data
(FLEED). The data include all Finnish rms and all individuals of ages 15-70. The
FLEED data are complemented with plant-level statistics from the Longitudinal Data
on Plants in Manufacturing (LDPM), which include all manufacturing plants with at
least ve employees, and with rm register information on whether the rm is foreign
or domestic-owned and on whether the rm is multinational. Firm and plant-level
statistics include variables such as value added, capital stock, number of employees,
wages, turnover/sales, R&D expenditure and industry.2 We restrict our analysis to
2R&D data is collected from: i) enterprises that reported R&D activities in the previous inquiry;
ii) enterprises that have received product development funding from TEKES (the Finnish Funding
Agency for Technology and Innovation); ii) all enterprises with more than 100 employees and a sample
of enterprises with 10-99 employees.
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manufacturing rms with at least 20 employees and to the period of 1997-2004.3 A
domestic MNE is dened as a domestic rm with operations abroad and a foreign MNE
is a rm with at least 20 percent of foreign ownership.4 Each individual is followed over
time. An individual exits the data if he/she turns 70 year, leaves the country or dies.
The individual-level statistics contain detailed information on characteristics including
education, occupation, annual earnings, gender, family status, work status and previous
work history. All data sets are linked together with unique individual, plant and rm
identiers.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 present some preliminary features of multinational and non-multinational
rms in the manufacturing sector both at rm and plant level.5 As can be seen from
Table 1, the number of non-multinational rms is more than twice as large as the
number of multinational rms, while the number of plants of multinational rms is
almost as large as, or even larger than, the number of plants of non-multinational rms.
This is obviously not unexpected since multinational rms tend to be larger and to own
several plants. Despite the short time dimension of our panel, the initial picture changes
substantially over the years since multinationals experience a much stronger growth rate
3Register information on whether the rm is multinational is available from 1997 onward and
information on start and end date of employment exist until 2004 which restricts the period of analysis
to 1997-2004. Firms which have more than 20 employees in 1997 but fall under this threshold in
subsequent years are included.
4We check if our empirical results are sensitive to the choice of a 20 percent threshold by using
alternative thresholds of ten and fty percent. All our main ndings are virtually unaltered.
5Multinational rms include both foreign and domestically owned rms. A large majority of man-
ufacturing rms with more than 20 employees are domestically owned. In our econometric analysis we
investigate whether the type of ownership matters.
8
in the number of rms and plants (39.9 percent and 29.8 respectively) compared to their
domestic non-multinational counterparts (20.4 percent and 7.1 percent respectively).
As unanimously found in the literature, multinational rms appear to run much
larger operations than purely local rms in terms of median number of employees,
turnover and value added (see Table 2). When focusing on median values, multination-
als have a larger wage bill relative to turnover than domestic rms. Also, multinational
rms are found to use capital more intensively.6 Furthermore, multinationals invest
in R&D more than purely domestic local rms. This is not surprising, since domestic
multinational rms tend to concentrate the bulk of their R&D activities in their home
country and foreign multinationals tend to concentrate in industries where they can
exploit their managerial expertise and superior technological skills. Finally, multina-
tional rms are found to be more protable as documented by the higher share of gross
operating prots over turnover.
Tables 3 and 4 display statistics quantifying employees entering domestic non-
multinational rms and multinational rms in the manufacturing sector. In Table
3 we distinguish all entrants and new entrants in the current year. All entrants is the
accumulated net number of entrants from current year and previous years as early as
the data set allows (since 1990). As expected, the share of all entrants increases over the
period. For instance, the share of all entrants in non-multinational rms increases from
16.7 to 24.1 percent between 1997 and 2004. It may be noticed that also the shares of
new entrants slightly increase, but the increase is not monotonous over the time period.
6In the productivity regressions we use plant-level data and capital is proxied by xed capital stock
computed by using the perpetual inventory methodology.
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The share of accumulated entrants tends to be somewhat larger in multinational rms.
One reason may be that multinationals were growing faster than the domestic rms
during the period. In our productivity analysis, we focus on the e¤ects of the accumu-
lated number of entrants as there may be a lag in the impact. In the mobility section,
we estimate the e¤ect of competition and productivity gap on worker transitions in
the current year. In Table 4, we distinguish the entrants to non-multinational rms by
the source rm type. We may note that the share of entrants from non-multinational
rms increases moderately over the period while the share of entrants coming from
multinational rms increases more distinctly as multinational rms gain importance in
the economy. In 2004, the share of workers in domestic rms with previous tenure in a
MNE is as high as 6.4 percent.
Table 5 displays some characteristics of the entrants in both types of rms at the
entry year. The MNEs employ a larger share of female workers, workers with a longer
education and a longer previous tenure than domestic non-MNEs, but the di¤erences
are small thus indicating that there is no obvious evidence of selection of employees
based on these observables.
Finally, in Tables 6 and 7, we provide evidence on the transitions occurring between
di¤erent types of rms. In Table 6, we analyze four di¤erent types of transitions; from
MNEs to both non-MNEs and other MNEs and from non-MNEs to both MNEs and non-
MNEs. The yearly transitions from MNEs to non-MNEs vary from 1.6 to 2.2 percent
of total employees. The annual share of employees moving to other MNEs is larger and
varies more over time.7 We also observe a symmetric pattern for the employees leaving
7A transition is identied when an employee changes both plant and rm identity codes of their
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non-MNEs. Comparatively, a larger number is found to move to other non-MNEs than
to MNEs. This overall pattern suggests that employees tend change employers within
the same type of rms.
In Table 7, we show statistics on workers moving frommultinational to non-multinational
rms. We do so since our primary interest is to analyze whether this type of worker
mobility generates productivity spillovers in the non-multinational rms. We split the
sample according to whether sending rms operate in low-tech industries as compared
to high-tech industries, since previous studies by Maliranta et al. (2009) and Kaiser
et al. (2011) have found the hiring of workers from R&D intensive or innovative rms
to be linked to better performance by hiring rms. Furthermore, we separate inter-
and intra- industry transitions since Fosfuri et al. (2001) predict worker mobility and
spillovers to be more likely when the local and the multinational rm do not compete
ercely in the product market or sell in independent or vertically related markets.
It is obvious from Table 7 that most workers moving from MNEs to non-MNEs
change industry.8 For instance, in 1997, the share of inter-industry movers on total
movers is 88.1 percent in low-tech and 92.3 percent in high-tech industries. This nding
is not peculiar only to 1997 since the share is found to be higher in high-tech industries
in most years. The observation is consistent with Fosfuri et al. model, which predicts
that spillovers are likely to materialize and mobility is more likely to occur in industries
where rms sell in independent or vertically related markets.
employer between year t and t+1. The ownership changes of plants when employee changes the rm
but not the plant code are not included. The transitions when employees are moving to other rms
and plants in connection with mergers and acquisition cannot be excluded. For instance, this could
explain why the number of transitions from MNEs to MNEs almost doubled in 2000.
8Intra- and inter-industry mobility is dened at two-digit level of industries.
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4 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical strategy consists of two complementary sets of econometric estimates.
In the rst part of the analysis, we estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglas production
function with rm-level data. The productivity analysis serves two di¤erent purposes.
It allows us to establish whether worker mobility from multinationals to local rms has
a positive e¤ect on the total factor productivity of local rms. This is obviously of
paramount importance given the purpose of this paper. Indeed, nding no e¤ect in
our data would make the analysis of the e¤ect of competition and absorptive capacity
on worker mobility far less interesting, simply because the transmission channel going
from competition to productivity via worker mobility would not be there. On the other
hand, the estimation of production functions allows us to recover rm level measures
of the technological distance of local rms from their multinational counterparts, this,
in turn, being a proxy for absorptive capacity.
The second part of the analysis, where we test the hypotheses of Fosfuri et al. on the
impact of competition on worker mobility, serves the main purpose of this paper. We
model the mobility patterns frommultinationals to local rms in a multivariate duration
framework to analyze how worker mobility as a mechanism of technology di¤usion
responds to the degree of competition in the product market and to the absorptive
capacity of the local rms. More specically, we apply the competing risks framework
to the analysis of the e¤ect of product market competition and absorptive capacity
on worker mobility from multinationals to local rms. This general transition model
accommodates situations like ours that involve more than one destination and can be
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therefore interpreted as a multivariate duration model involving the joint specication
and estimation of two or more hazard functions.9
4.1 Spillover E¤ects: Econometric Framework
We start from the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yit = AitL
l
it K
k
it i = 1; 2; :::; N ; t = 1; 2; :::T (1)
where Yit, Kit and Lit denote respectively production, capital stock and quality adjusted
labor of plant i at time t. Quality adjusted labor is equal to:
Lit = L
N
it + L
M
it (1 + ) = Lit(1 + sit) (2)
where LMit and L
N
it denote labor with MNE experience and labor without such experi-
ence, Lit = LNit + L
M
it and sit is the share of total labour, Lit with MNE experience. In
this context, the unknown parameter,  can be interpreted as a positive productivity
premium (Balsvik, 2011) generated by the technology spillover embodied in LMit . The
productivity term Ait is modelled as follows:
Ait = e
t+i+uit (3)
9In our application a worker employed by a multinational rm could in fact alternatively: i) move
to a local rm in the same industry or in a di¤erent industry, ii) move to a di¤erent multinational
rm, iii) turn into self employment, iv) enter unemployment, v) exit the labor market.
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where t is a time specic intercept, i is the individual e¤ect which in the present
context can be thought of as unobserved plant characteristics that can be viewed as
constant over the sample period, and uit is the serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic er-
ror.10 By using equations (1), (2) and (3), by taking logs and by using the approx-
imation l lnL
l
it = l lnL
l
it + lsit, equation (1) can be rewritten in the following
representation:
yit = llit + lsit + kkit + t + i + uit (4)
where yit, lit, and kit are the logarithms of Yit, Lit, Kit respectively. To recover consis-
tent estimates of the expected e¤ect on productivity of the share of labor with MNE
experience, sit, holding all other variables xed, reasonable identication assumptions
have to be made. In particular, it seems sensible to assume that both standard input
factors (lit; kit) and the labor share (sit) are correlated with the individual e¤ect (i).
This allows for the possibility that plant and rm heterogeneity if observable to man-
agers even if not to the econometricianmatter in hiring decisions of workers with MNE
experience.
Estimating equation (4) by the standard within group transformation does not put
any restriction on the conditional distribution of i with respect to all past, present and
future input levels, but it requires that all inputs are strictly exogenous with respect to
the idiosyncratic component, uit thus ruling out the possibility that managers adjust
their input levels after observing past or present idiosyncratic productivity shocks.11
10We also allow for a less restrictive characterization of the idiosyncratic component of the error
term. See equations (5) and (6).
11Note that this is the benchmark identication strategy adopted in Balsvik (2011).
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Although within-group estimation of equation (4) controls for unobserved hetero-
geneity, the share of employees with MNE experienceas well as other input factorsare
unlikely to be orthogonal to present and past idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, prot-
maximizing rms respond to productivity shocks by adjusting their inputs accordingly.
Ignoring the correlation between the choice of inputs and the unobservable component
of the error term would therefore yield inconsistent results.
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of labour mobility on produc-
tivity, we rely on the estimation technique proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
This estimation method follows Olley and Pakes (1996) who develop an estimator that
uses investment as a proxy for unobservable productivity shocks.12 Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) point out that investment is lumpy and may not smoothly respond to the
productivity shock, thus violating a basic condition for the validity of their approach.
They show that using intermediate inputs can solve the simultaneity problem. In ad-
dition, the approach avoids truncating all the zero investment rms, since rms almost
always report positive use of intermediate inputs like electricity or materials.
Operationally, the idiosyncratic error uit in equation (3) is redened as the sum of
the transmitted productivity component, vit, and an error term that is uncorrelated
with input choices, "it:
uit = vit + "it (5)
Demand for intermediate input mit is assumed to depend on the rms state variables
12This approach has been used in the related empirical literature on productivity spillovers and
worker mobility by Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012).
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kit and vit:
mit = mit(kit; vit) (6)
Under monotonicity the demand function can be inverted, thus allowing vit to be written
as function of kit and mit:
vit = vit(mit; kit) (7)
The unobservable productivity term is now expressed solely as a function of two ob-
served inputs. Finally, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) assume that productivity is gov-
erned by a rst-order Markov process:
vit = E(vitjvit 1) + it (8)
where it is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with kit, but not neces-
sarily with lit which is part of the simultaneity problem. Under this set of assumptions,
all unknown parameters in equation (4) can be consistently estimated by a two-step
semi-parametric econometric approach.
4.2 Spillover E¤ects: Results
Given the purpose of this paper, we estimate plant-level productivity equations sep-
arately for the sub-samples of non-multinational and multinational rms, the latter
including both foreign and domestic MNEs.13 To take into account the possibility that
technology spillovers occur only in high-tech industries, we also allow for the parame-
13Productivity estimations are carried out at the plant level since plant-level data for capital, labor
and intermediate inputs are more detailed.
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ters of interest to di¤er between high-tech and low-tech rms.14 In addition to the
standard input variables (labor and capital), each equation includes additional regres-
sors measuring the share of workers who have previously worked in a multinational
(MNE) and the share of workers previously employed in non-multinational rms (non-
MNE). In some specications, we also control for additional features of moving workers
including the length of previous tenure (MNE-tenure and non-MNE-tenure), the level
(MNE-higher-education and MNE-lower-education) and the type of education (MNE-
technical-education and MNE-non-technical-education).
Our basic results are summarized in Table 8. Obviously, we are mostly interested in
the sign and size of the coe¢ cient of the labor share sMNE and the associated parameter
MNE as estimated on the sample of non-multinational rms, since this is the technology
transmission channel we are focusing on. Operationally, we dene two versions of the
labor share; in columns (i), (iii) and (v) the share sMNE includes all workers who
have been hired from MNEs, irrespective of the length of the previous MNE tenure. In
columns (ii), (iv) and (vi) the share sMNE tenure includes only workers hired fromMNEs
with a minimum of two years of previous MNE tenure.15 The labor shares (snon MNE)
and (snon MNE tenure); are dened in the same way but for the employees hired from
non-multinational rms.
For the total sample of non-multinational plants and for the sub-sample of plants
belonging to low-tech rms, the coe¢ cients MNE and MNE tenure turn out to be
14High-tech rms are dened as rms belonging to the tertiary of three-digit industries with the
highest R&D expenditures (industries with more than 2.55% R&D expenditures of total sales in 1997)
and the rest of the rms are dened as Low/Medium tech rms.
15Balsvik (2011) uses this denition of the labor share in her estimations. We have checked that our
results are robust also for one year of tenure threshold.
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statistically insignicant (see columns (i) and (v)). However, for the plants of high-tech
rms (column (iii)), the coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant. Furthermore,
it is economically sizeable since it implies a productivity premium as large as 0.372. This
means that workers hired from MNEs contribute on average 37.2 percent more to the
productivity of the plant than the incumbent workers. The result is similar for the
MNE tenure parameter, with a productivity premium of 35.9 percent associated to the
employees with a minimum of two years of previous tenure in a MNE. This is higher
than the productivity premium of 20 percent that Balsvik (2011) found workers with
MNE experience contribute to the productivity of their plant as compared to workers
without such experience. However, a major di¤erence is that we nd a premium only
in the sub-sample of high-tech rms while she did not make such a distinction.
In order for our identication approach to be convincing, we also have to show that
the productivity premium we estimate is peculiar to the type of worker mobility we are
focusing on, that is the transitions from multinationals to domestic non-multinational
rms. The rst alternative explanation we have to rule out is therefore the possibility
that what matters for the productivity of domestic non-multinational rms is simply the
hiring of new employees, regardless of the characteristics of their previous work place.
This might be the case, because of new hires have better skills or are likely to put
more e¤ort in order to get tenure or, more simply, to reveal their unknown ability type.
The alternative hypothesis can be tested by looking at the parameters non MNE and
non MNE tenure as estimated for the plants of high-tech non-multinational rms (see
columns (iii) and (iv)). It turns out that the estimated parameters are much smaller
in size, or even negative, and not di¤erent from zero at conventional statistical lev-
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els. Taken at its face value, this nding corroborates the hypothesis that technology
spillovers through worker mobility are associated to transitions from multinationals
to domestic non-multinational rms, but not to transitions of workers between non-
multinationals.
Another implicit basic assumption of our approach has been so far that the direc-
tion of spillovers through worker mobility is from multinationals to non-multinationals,
and consequently, that spillovers are not relevant in the opposite direction. This need
not to be the case, because multinationals and purely domestic rms might have com-
plementary comparative advantages. For instance, multinationals could benet from
hiring workers with a more pronounced local background. If this is the case, non MNE
and non MNE tenure should enter with a positive sign in the equations estimated on
the sample of multinational rms. This conjecture is not supported by the data since
these parameters are not statistically di¤erent from zero (columns (vii)-(xii)). However,
multinational rms seem to benet from hiring workers from other multinationals. In
fact the coe¢ cients MNE and MNE tenure are positive and statistically signicant in
the estimations for the total sample of MNEs (columns (vii) and (viii)). However,
the same parameters turn out to be statistically insignicant and much smaller in size
(0.118 and 0.154 respectively) when estimated on the sub-sample of high-tech rms.
To sum up, results presented in Table 8 show that worker mobility from multina-
tional rms to non-multinational rms in high-tech industries generate sizeable pro-
ductivity e¤ects. Furthermore, whether we include all former MNE employees or select
only the employees with some minimum length of tenure matters only slightly for the
size of the productivity premium. Finally, these estimated e¤ects seem to be specic to
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the type of mobility we are interested into. Since our data allow us also to distinguish
between foreign and domestic multinationals, we have analyzed whether ownership mat-
ters. Our results indicate that this distinction does not have any empirical relevance,
neither for the total sample of plants nor for the two sub-samples of high-tech and
low-tech plants.16
In Table 9 we focus on the role played by education as captured by complementary
measures which are observable at the individual level. Previous research has argued
that the ability of workers to transfer and apply new knowledge depends on education
(Kaiser et al., 2011 and Poole, 2013). We distinguish workers with MNE experience
in two ways: 1) by the length of education: lower educated workers have an education
up to 12 years (equivalent of upper secondary education) and higher educated workers
have an education longer than 12 years (equivalent of tertiary education), and 2) by the
technical education: workers with technical education at upper secondary to tertiary
level.17
Given the ndings obtained so far, we focus on the high-tech sub-sample but we
keep the distinction between non-multinationals and multinationals. In column (i) and
(iv), shares are included separately for higher and lower educated workers, in columns
(ii) and (v) shares are included separately for workers with technical and non-technical
education and in columns (iii) and (vi) shares are included separately for workers with
higher technical and non-technical education. Consistently with our previous ndings,
we do not nd any e¤ect for the sub-sample of multinationals since estimated parame-
16Results are not reported but available upon request.
17Denitions are according to the International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED).
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ters are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. When we turn to non-multinationals, the
estimated productivity premium seems to be driven by the workers with technical edu-
cation. Here, the productivity premium turns out to be as high as 80 percent (column
(ii)). These results suggest that high-tech rms can better absorb and benet from the
knowledge of workers with technical education hired from MNEs. When we instead
focus on education levels, punctual estimates suggest that the productivity premium
exists and is considerable (48 percent) only for workers with a shorter education. The
impact of highly educated workers is null. This result is somewhat surprising as we
would expect high-tech rms to benet from the human capital of the hired workers.
A plausible explanation is that productivity spillovers are primarily attached to the
knowledge acquired by employees with technical education who are working closer to
the main production lines and R&D units, rather than by the group of highly educated
employees including, in addition to engineers, other professional categories such as ac-
countants, business administrators and lawyers. To investigate this hypothesis further,
we split the share of highly educated workers by technical education (columns (iii) and
(vi)). The impact of workers with higher technical education is positive, while the im-
pact of workers with other higher education is negative, although it is not statistically
signicant.18 The very large productivity premium suggests that the selective group of
workers with higher technical education bring with them rather valuable knowledge.
18If we include the share of lower educated workers with MNE experience in columns (iii) and (vi),
the punctual estimates are virtually the same. However, they are less precisely estimated since the
share variables tend to be positively correlated.
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4.3 Worker Mobility: Econometric Framework
The productivity analysis provides evidence that worker mobility from multinationals
to local rms has a positive e¤ect on the total factor productivity of local rms, but
only in high-tech industries. This evidence gives a convincing reason to analyze further
the transmission channel going from competition to productivity via worker mobility.
Albeit the focus of this paper is on the role played by product market competition
on the mobility from a multinational to a local rm, we have to take into account
that a worker operating in a multinational rm faces J distinct potential causes of
transition. In the survival analysis literature, these destination states are commonly
labeled as risk factors. In our application a worker employed by a multinational rm
could in fact alternatively: i) move to a local rm in the same industry or in a di¤erent
industry, ii) move to a di¤erent multinational rm, iii) turn into self employment, iv)
enter unemployment or v) exit the labor market.19
More formally, we can dene J random variables Tj(j = 1; :::; J) describing the
duration until risk j is materialized. The obvious problem here is that only the small-
est of all these durations, T is identiable by the data since all other durations are
censored. In fact, all is known is that their realizations are longer than T . In most
economic applications, including ours, one is interested in one or more of the marginal
distributions of the Tj. As pointed out by van den Berg (2005), under independency it
would be perfectly legitimate to employ standard duration analysis for each of the Tj
separately, treating the other random variables Ti(i 6= j) as independent right-censoring
19Recent surveys of the so-called competing risks models can be found in Putter et al (2006) for
biostatistcs and in van den Berg for economics (2005).
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variables. However, economic theory often suggests that they are dependent. This can
be the case, for instance, if they are a¤ected by individual behavior and individuals are
heterogenous. This is certainly the case in our application since workers di¤er because
of both observable (e.g. age and gender) and unobservable (e.g. taste for mobility)
characteristics and, in turn, these characteristics are likely to be associated to di¤erent
forms of mobility. Under dependency and without additional structure or data neither
the joint distribution of all Tj nor the net hazard rates of their marginal distributions
can be identied.
This general non-identication result can be, at least partially, overcome by spec-
ifying semiparametric models that include observedpossibly time varyingindividual
characteristics, x. The cause-specic hazard function, j(t), that is the hazard of failing
from a given cause in the presence of competing events, can be estimated from the data.
In general, however, the impact of a change in a given covariate, xk on the probability of
leaving the initial state via risk j (the so-called cumulative incidence function) is hard
to calculate since this marginal e¤ect not only depends on the e¤ect of the covariate
on cause j but also on the e¤ects of the covariate on all other causes as well as on the
baseline hazards for all other causes.20 To overcome this analytical problem, in this
paper we adopt the approach proposed by Fine and Grey (1999). They dene a sub-
distribution hazard, j(t) which di¤ers from the standard cause-specic hazard, j(t).
In detail, the risk set for the cause-specic hazard decreases whenever there is a failure
of another cause. For the subdistribution hazard, individuals leaving the initial state
20Thomas (1996) shows, however, that with competing risks models of the proportional hazard type
marginal e¤ects can be signed if the estimated coe¢ cient in the relevant cause-specic hazard function
is larger than the corresponding coe¢ cients in all other cause-specic hazard functions.
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for another cause remain in the risky set instead. The advantage of modelling the sub-
distribution hazard is that the cumulative incidence function can be easily calculated
as:
CIFj(t) = 1  exp( 
tR
0
j(t)dt) (9)
Finally, the model is semiparametric since the baseline subhazard, j;0(t) is left unspec-
ied while the e¤ects of the covariates x are assumed to be proportional:
j(t) = j;0(t) exp(x
0j) (10)
where j is a vector collecting the covariate e¤ects on cause j.
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Our purpose is to test the relevance of the two main hypotheses derived from the
model of Fosfuri et al. (2001). That is, whether worker mobility and technological
spillovers are more likely to materialize when the local and the multinational rm do
not compete ercely in the product market or sell in independent or vertically related
markets, and whether technology transfer is more likely to occur when the absorptive
capacity of the local rm is su¢ ciently high. The competition is expected to be more
intensive and, therefore, to have a negative e¤ect on worker mobility between rms
within the same industry, as compared to worker mobility between rms in di¤erent
industries. We run separate regressions to assess whether the e¤ect of competition
di¤ers for intra- and inter-industry worker mobility.
To test for the e¤ect of the toughness of competition on the incentive for the multi-
21The competing risks model proposed by Fine and Grey (1999) is estimated by using the stsrreg
stata command.
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national to keep the worker, we include price-cost margins (PCM) among the covariates.
Following Aghion et al. (2005) and Nickell (1996), the price cost margin we use at the
rm level is measured by operating prots net of the cost of capital divided by value
added. The cost of capital is assumed to be 0.085 for all rms and time periods (same
as Aghion et al. assume). Our competition measure is simply the weighted average of
this across rms within the same three-digit industry:
PCMjt =
P
i
xijtP
i
xijt
OPijt   CCijt
V Aijt
(11)
where OPijt, CCijt, V Aijt and xijt denote respectively operating prots, cost of capital,
value added and output of rm i in industry j at time t: As robustness, we also dene
an alternative PCM measure as:
PCMjt =
P
i
xijtP
i
xijt
OPijt
xijt
(12)
In order to assess the importance of absorptive capacity of the receiving rm, we
compute a rm-specic productivity gap measure (PRG) based on our productivity
estimations commented upon in section 4.2. More specically:
PRGit = TFPijt   TFP jt (13)
where TFPijt denotes the total factor productivity of multinational rm i in industry
j at time t and and TFP jt denotes the average total factor productivity of non-
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multinational rms in industry j at time t.22 As the main proxy for absorptive capac-
ity, we use the productivity gap between the sending MNE and the average domestic
non-MNE rm in the same three-digit industry. In order to capture the impact of pro-
ductivity lead of a multinational rm in relation to non-multinational rms, we replace
negative values of the gap measure with zeros. Since this measure could be sensitive to
extreme observations, particularly in small industries, we also use the same measure at
the two-digit level as robustness check.23 To sum up, the aim of the multivariate dura-
tion analysis is to determine whether and how PCM and PRG impact the probability
of moving to a domestic rm, controlling for the other individual- and rm-specic
covariates.
4.4 Worker Mobility: Results
In assessing the e¤ect of product market competition and absorptive capacity on worker
mobility between rms, we rst identify those workers who are employed in a multina-
tional in 1997, that is our rst sample year, and we trace them over the entire sample
period. Our main focus is on worker mobility in high-tech industries where we found
evidence for productivity spillovers. We distinguish intra- and inter-industry mobility
since Fosfuri et al. maintain that worker mobility and technological spillovers are more
likely to materialize when the local and the multinational rm do not compete ercely
in the product market or when they sell in independent or vertically related market.
22For multi-plant rms productivity is computed as the weighted average of the estimated produc-
tivity of rm is plants in industry j (either at 2- or 3-digit level of industries). Plant level productivity
is estimated as described in section 3.1 and output is used as weights.
23In addition, we also rerun all estimated models presented in the next sub-section without setting
equal to zero all negative values of the gap measure. This change has no e¤ect whatsover on all our
main results.
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Predictions received from the theory suggest that PCM should enter with a positive
sign in the specications for intra-industry worker mobility, indicating that less erce
competition increases worker mobility between rms in the same industry. The pro-
ductivity gap is expected to enter with a negative sign, indicating that a smaller gap
and larger absorptive capacity increases worker mobility between rms in the same in-
dustry. Since the measures of competition and productivity gap are dened at industry
level, they are not expected to be related to inter-industry mobility in any particular
manner. In all regressions, we also include several standard individual level variables:
age, gender, marital and parenthood status, educational level, income and regional lo-
cation. Finally, this baseline model is augmented with (log) rm size and with a set of
aggregate time dummies capturing aggregate business cycle e¤ects.
In the rst set of equations, we dene the mobility from multinational rms to a
purely domestic rm in the same industry as the main destination state. Overall, we
have a sample of 280,814 observations in high-tech industries. Of those, 544 workers are
found to move to a domestic non-multinational rm within the same industry. We treat
as competing events moves to a domestic non-multinational rm in a di¤erent industry
(3,900 workers), to a di¤erent multinational rm (14,067 workers), to unemployment
(5,173) and out of labor market (5,522). All other observations are treated as censored.24
As mentioned in the previous section, we experiment with di¤erent denitions of our
main variables of interest, PCM and productivity gap, and all our main ndings are
virtually unaltered.
24Transfer to self-employment are treated as sensored, since these transfers cannot be identied in
a clear-cut way in the data.
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Overall, results in Table 10 conrm received theoretical predictions. In the subdis-
tribution hazard function for the purely domestic rm destination state, the coe¢ cient
on the PCM variable is positive and statistically signicant in all specications. These
results suggest that a less competitive environment with higher price-cost margins is
associated to worker mobility between rms in the same industry. This is consistent
with the theoretical predictions of Fosfuri et al. of competition a¤ecting worker mo-
bility adversely. Furthermore, the sign of the productivity gap is indeed negative and
statistically signicant in all specications, indicating that a larger productivity gap,
indicating smaller absorptive capacity of non-multinationals as compared to multina-
tionals, decreases worker transitions frommultinational to non-multinational rms. The
estimated parameters on parenthood status, education and metropolitan Helsinki lo-
cation are negative and statistically signicant in all columns, implying that all these
variables slow down the transition to purely domestic rms. Of the other control vari-
ables, only marital status and rm size enter with a statistically signicant positive
e¤ect, the latter suggesting that a larger rm size accelerates the transition to purely
domestic rms. On the other hand, age, gender and income level, have not statistically
signicant impact on the transitions.
Obviously, the fact that our results so far fully match the theoretical predictions is
not a direct test of the existence of the transmission channel we are interested in. A
substantial step forward can be made by investigating whether our main ndings also
apply to other transitions or whether they are indeed specic to our destination state
of interest. For this reason, in Table 11 we report the results for the transitions from
multinational rms to three alternative destination states. The rst column displays
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the results for the transitions from multinational rms in high-tech industries to other
multinationals in the same industry.25 The PCM measure is negative and signicant in
this specication, indicating the opposite result that a more competitive environment
with lower price-cost margins increases worker mobility between multinational rms
within the same industry. This, in turn, reinforces our previous conclusion that the
negative e¤ect of competition on labor mobility is present only in environments where
technology spillovers have clearly been detected. The productivity gap enters with a
positive sign in this equation. Taken at its face value, this implies that workers tend
to move to other multinationals more often when purely local rms lag substantially
behind.
The second column of Table 11 shows the results for the transitions from multina-
tionals in high-tech industries to non-multinational rms in other, including both high-
and low-tech, industries.26 To the extent that our ndings in Table 10 are truly asso-
ciated to the transmission channel identied by Fosfuri et al, we should not expect the
PCM in the sending industry to enter with a positive sign. Indeed, the industry-level
competition measure enters with the opposite sign. Taken at its face value, this seems
to suggest that competition in the sending industry makes workers more likely to move
from multinationals to purely local rms operating in di¤erent industries. More impor-
tantly for our purpose, it points out that our main results do not hold across the board
but are localized to the destination state we are focusing on. The sign on the produc-
25The competing events are: transitions to multinationals in other industries, to non-multinationals,
to unemployment and out of labor market.
26Intra- and inter-industry mobility is dened at the two-digit industry level. The competing events
are: transitions to non-multinationals in the same industry, to multinationals, to unemployment and
out of labor market.
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tivity gap is positive and smaller in size than in the regressions for multi-to-non-multi
mobility as shown in Table 10, thus suggesting, as expected, that the productivity gaps
within the industry matters less for inter-industry mobility.
The third column of Table 11 displays the results for intra-industry transitions from
multinational to non-multinational rms in low-tech industries.27 These are exactly
those industries for which we do not nd signicant spillover e¤ects. The coe¢ cients
on PCM and the productivity gap are both negative. Furthermore, they are both
signicantly di¤erent from zero at conventional statistical level. Once again, this is
broadly coherent with our main message: competition inhibits worker mobility only in
industries with productivity spillovers and has the opposite e¤ect on transitions and in
industries where spillover e¤ects are absent. However, productivity gap seem to matter
for worker mobility even in low/medium technology industries where spillover e¤ects
were not detected.
Finally, the ndings on productivity summarized in section 4.2 point out to the pe-
culiar role played by technical education in allowing the transmission of knowledge from
multinationals to local rms. If this is the case, we should therefore expect competition
and productivity gap to play a larger role in explaining worker mobility for this type of
workers. To shed light on this issue we report additional equations in Table 12, where
we interact the technical education dummy variable with the productivity gap (column
(i)) and the PCM measure (column (ii)). In the rst column, the coe¢ cient on the
interaction term is signicant and has the opposite sign with respect to the coe¢ cient
27The competing events are: transitions to non-multinationals in other industries, to multinationals,
to unemployment and out of labor market.
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on the productivity gap measure, thus reducing the e¤ect of the productivity gap for
technically educated workers from -0.846 to -0.620. In other words, absorptive capacity
still increases worker mobility but less so for workers with technical education.
In the second column, the technical education dummy is interacted with the com-
petition measure. Here, the competition measure and the interaction term have both
positive signs indicating that the e¤ect of competition may have somewhat larger impact
on the mobility of workers with technical education (0.637 vs 0.708), but the interaction
term is not statistically signicant. The smaller impact of the productivity gap may
indicate that technical education of the movers compensates for a larger productivity
gap and a weaker absorptive capacity between rms.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we exploit a large longitudinal employer-employee data set for Finland to
test for the e¤ect of product market conditions on worker mobility from multinational
to domestic rms. In doing so, we rst document the size of this phenomenon. Overall,
purely domestic rms are found to hire mainly workers moving from other domestic
rms. However, worker mobility from multinationals, both domestic and foreign, is not
trivial and has grown substantially over our sample period. In 2004, for instance, the
share of workers in domestic rms with previous tenure in a MNE is as high as 6.4
percent.
Secondly, we provide evidence that workers with previous tenure in a MNE are
more productive compared to other workers employed in purely domestic rms. In
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particular, workers hired from MNEs in high-tech industries contribute on average 37
percent more to the productivity of the plant than the incumbent workers. This nding
allows us to conclude that the transmission mechanism we are interested in is indeed
present in our data.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge we are the rst to test whether the degree of
competition in an industry enhances or hampers the di¤usion of technology through
worker mobility. Our main results show that worker mobility from MNEs to local
rms is more likely to occur when competition is low and when local rms are not
too far from the technological frontier. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical
predictions coming from Fosfuri et al. model. Our analysis presents further evidence
that competition inhibits worker mobility only in industries with productivity spillovers
and has the opposite e¤ect on transitions and in industries where spillover e¤ects are
absent. More generally, this paper shows the presence of an additional, and possibly
counter-intuitive, channel trough which competition can a¤ect productivity.
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Table 1. Non-multinational and multinational rms and plants
Firms Plants
Total Non-MNEs MNEs Total Non-MNEs MNEs
Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share
1997 2,304 1,614 0.701 690 0.299 2,813 1,453 0.517 1,310 0.466
1998 2,473 1,725 0.698 748 0.302 2,981 1,546 0.519 1,435 0.481
1999 2,589 1,796 0.694 772 0.298 3,042 1,616 0.531 1,426 0.469
2000 2,690 1,868 0.694 802 0.298 3,007 1,570 0.522 1,437 0.478
2001 2,776 1,930 0.695 828 0.298 3,188 1,680 0.527 1,508 0.473
2002 2,814 1,915 0.681 880 0.313 3,095 1,547 0.500 1,548 0.500
2003 2,854 1,915 0.671 913 0.320 3,137 1,520 0.485 1,617 0.515
2004 2,950 1,944 0.659 965 0.327 3,256 1,556 0.478 1,700 0.522
Note: Manufacturing rms with at least 20 employees and their plants. The total number of rms
can exceed the sum of multinational and non-multinational rms since some rms lack
information about their multinational status.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on non-multinational and multinational rms
(1997-2004 mean and median)
Non-MNEs MNEs
Mean Median Mean Median
Turnover 6,302.6 3312.6 95,092.4 17,677.3
Employees 48.1 30.6 311.6 103.5
Value Added 2,164.5 1289.5 24,285.6 5635.1
Wages/Turnover 0.268 0.247 0.306 0.185
Capital/Turnover 0.458 0.246 1.880 0.269
R&D/Turnover* 0.024 0.003 0.028 0.009
PCM** 0.046 0.162 0.174 0.207
No of obs 16,623 7,564
Note: Manufacturing rms with at least 20 employees. * R&D data are
collected for the rms that fulll the selection criterias of Statistics
Finland, see footnote 3. ** Dened as in equation 11.
36
T
ab
le
3.
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
at
is
ti
cs
on
w
or
ke
rs

en
tr
y
m
ob
ili
ty
E
nt
ra
nt
s
in
no
n-
M
N
E
s
E
nt
ra
nt
s
in
M
N
E
s
A
ll
en
tr
an
ts
N
ew
en
tr
an
ts
A
ll
en
tr
an
ts
N
ew
en
tr
an
ts
N
um
b
er
Sh
ar
e
of
em
pl
oy
ed
N
um
b
er
Sh
ar
e
of
em
pl
oy
ed
N
um
b
er
Sh
ar
e
of
em
pl
oy
ed
N
um
b
er
Sh
ar
e
of
em
pl
oy
ed
19
97
15
,8
19
0.
16
7
5,
07
8
0.
05
4
43
,8
17
0.
18
1
11
,5
63
0.
04
8
19
98
17
,1
25
0.
18
1
5,
90
7
0.
06
3
47
,7
02
0.
18
8
12
,3
83
0.
04
9
19
99
18
,2
15
0.
19
0
6,
18
6
0.
06
4
50
,2
68
0.
20
2
13
,8
79
0.
05
6
20
00
19
,8
67
0.
20
7
7,
37
9
0.
07
7
56
,1
22
0.
21
3
16
,7
89
0.
06
4
20
01
20
,3
81
0.
22
2
6,
49
5
0.
07
1
63
,2
68
0.
23
6
24
,2
06
0.
09
0
20
02
18
,9
47
0.
22
7
5,
20
6
0.
06
2
59
,4
10
0.
22
7
12
,2
97
0.
04
7
20
03
18
,2
54
0.
22
7
4,
74
6
0.
05
9
59
,4
84
0.
23
1
10
,7
28
0.
04
2
20
04
19
,2
36
0.
24
1
5,
15
5
0.
06
4
60
,7
40
0.
23
5
12
,5
00
0.
04
8
N
ot
e:
In
cl
ud
es
en
tr
an
ts
co
m
in
g
fr
om
an
y
ot
he
r
em
pl
oy
er
to
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
r
m
s
w
it
h
at
le
as
t
20
em
pl
oy
ee
s.
37
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on workersentry mobility - entrants to non-MNE by
source
All entrants in non-MNEs
from MNEs from non-MNEs
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
1997 967 0.010 13,578 0.144
1998 2,273 0.024 13,583 0.144
1999 2,934 0.031 13,569 0.141
2000 3,833 0.040 14,503 0.151
2001 4,502 0.049 14,484 0.158
2002 4,162 0.050 13,555 0.162
2003 4,435 0.055 12,782 0.159
2004 5,086 0.064 13,134 0.164
Note: Includes entrants coming from multinational rms to
manufacturing rms with at least 20 employees.
Table 5. Characteristics of entrants at entry year (1997-2004 mean and median)
Non-MNEs MNEs
Mean Median Mean Median
Age 31.6 29.0 31.1 28.0
Education years 11.8 12.0 12.4 12.0
Previous tenure in years 3.36 1.0 3.90 1.0
Gender (share of female workers) 0.296 0.350
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics on annual transitions of workers
From MNEs
to non-MNEs
From MNEs
to MNEs
From non-MNEs
to non-MNEs
From non-MNEs
to MNEs
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
1997 3,895 0.016 6,328 0.026 3,799 0.040 1,679 0.018
1998 4,600 0.018 9,613 0.038 3,917 0.041 1,449 0.015
1999 5,380 0.022 8,884 0.036 4,898 0.051 2,606 0.027
2000 5,444 0.021 17,644 0.067 4,389 0.046 1,851 0.019
2001 4,494 0.017 7,082 0.026 3,857 0.042 1,444 0.016
2002 4,567 0.017 6,419 0.025 3,210 0.038 1,580 0.019
2003 4,486 0.017 6,614 0.026 3,349 0.042 1,155 0.014
2004 5,305 0.021 11,669 0.045 4,126 0.052 1,583 0.020
Note: Includes employees moving from manufacturing rms with at least 20 employees to any other rms.
Some individuals lack information about the multinational status of their new employer and are therefore
missing. Transitions of employees due to ownership changes of plants or rms are excluded.
Table 7. Descriptive statistics on annual worker separations from MNEs to non-MNEs
Low/medium-tech industries High-tech industry
Total Share of Total Share of
Number
Share of
employed
Intra-
industry
Inter-
industry
Number
Share of
employed
Intra-
industry
Inter-
industry
1997 2,476 0.016 0.119 0.881 1,419 0.017 0.077 0.923
1998 2,835 0.017 0.079 0.921 1,765 0.020 0.081 0.919
1999 3,038 0.019 0.125 0.875 2,342 0.024 0.085 0.915
2000 3,074 0.018 0.129 0.871 2,370 0.025 0.032 0.968
2001 2,634 0.015 0.088 0.921 1,860 0.019 0.041 0.959
2002 2,753 0.017 0.123 0.877 1,814 0.019 0.035 0.965
2003 2,851 0.018 0.147 0.853 1,635 0.017 0.060 0.940
2004 3,254 0.020 0.097 0.903 2,051 0.022 0.211 0.789
Note: See Table 6
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Table 9. Productivity estimation - Human capital in high-tech sample
Non-multinationals Multinationals
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
l 0.722*** 0.724*** 0.727*** 0.741*** 0.733*** 0.739***
(0.044) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041) (0.038)
k 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.115* 0.118** 0.116**
(0.038) (0.033) (0.036) (0.058) (0.065) (0.058)
s MNE-higher-edu 0.055 0.396
(0.397) (0.226)
s MNE-lower-edu 0.345** -0.074
(0.172) (0.128)
s MNE-technical-edu 0.577*** 0.207
(0.200) (0.137)
s MNE-non-technical-edu -0.176 -0.124
(0.245) (0.228)
s MNE-technical-higher-edu 0.859* 0.297
(0.395) (0.259)
s MNE-non-technical-higher-edu -1.024 0.533
(0.395) (0.572)
s non-MNE -0.017 -0.017 -0.012 0.084 0.087 0.090
(0.085) (0.086) (0.079) (0.077) (0.080) (0.091)
Structural parameters
MNE higher edu 0.077 0.535
(0.549) (0.305)
MNE lower edu 0.478** -0.099
(0.237) (0.172)
MNE technical edu 0.797*** 0.283
(0.272) (0.188)
MNE non technical edu -0.243 -0.169
(0.340) (0.312)
MNE technical higher edu 1.183* 0.402
(0.663) (0.353)
MNE non technical higher edu -1.409 0.722
(1.271) (0.770)
non MNE -0.024 -0.024 -0.017 0.114 0.119 0.122
(0.118) (0.119) (0.110) (0.105) (0.110) (0.125)
No. obs 2,127 2,127 2,127 2,554 2,554 2,554
Note: Dependent variable log(value added). All regressions include year and industry-year
interaction dummies. *** signicant at the one, ** at the ve and * at the ten percent level.
Standard errors clustered on plants in parenthesis.
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Table 10. Mobility equations - Movers from MNEs to non-MNEs within high-tech
industries
High-tech intra-industry destination state
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Age -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Gender -0.001 -0.021 -0.021 -0.037
(0.092) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090)
Marital status 0.176* 0.181* 0.169* 0.173*
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Parenthood status -0.175** -0.181** -0.178** -0.183**
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078)
Education -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.087***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Income -0.034 0.051 0.017 0.026
(0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058)
Location -1.654*** -1.629*** -1.664*** -1.644***
(0.196) (0.198) (0.197) (0.198)
Log rm size 0.155*** 0.167*** 0.133*** 0.135***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Productivity gap 3-digit -0.723*** -0.607***
(0.070) (0.067)
Productivity gap 2-digit -0.687*** -0.503***
(0.078) (0.072)
Price-cost margin* 0.653*** 0.671***
(0.042) (0.043)
Price-cost margin** 1.853*** 1.615***
(0.562) (0.548)
Wald test of joint sign. 1,795.24 1,727.13 1,956.43 1,959.55
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 280,814 284,982 280,814 284,982
No of subjects 74,284 74,284 74,284 74,784
No of failed 544 555 554 555
No. competing 28,662 28,993 28,662 28,993
Note: *Our main measure of PCM, dened as in equation (11). **Dened as in
equation (12). Year dummies included as additional regressors.
Firm-year clustered standard errors (probability levels) in round (square) brackets.
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Table 11. Mobility Equations - Testing the model by looking at alternative
destination states
High-tech
Multi-to-Multi
Intra-Industry
High-tech
Multi-to-non-Multi
Inter-Industry
Low/Medium-tech
Multi-to-non-Multi
Intra-Industry
Age 0.008*** -0.028*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Gender -0.287*** -0.196*** -0.389***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.083)
Marital status 0.017 -0.042 0.035
(0.029) (0.038) (0.075)
Parenthood status 0.028 0.038 0.016
(0.018) (0.025) (0.054)
Education 0.028*** -0.016* -0.046***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.017)
Income 0.293*** -0.079*** -0.052
(0.020) (0.024) (0.101)
Location -0.014 0.007 0.117
(0.029) (0.040) (0.108)
Log rm size 0.658*** -0.110*** -0.434***
(0.017) (0.012) (0.027)
Productivity gap 3-digit 0.015 0.069** -0.284***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.041)
Price-cost margin* -0.297*** -0.149*** -4.771***
(0.067) (0.034) (0.651)
Wald test of joint sign. 14,354.34 3,726.21 1938.64
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 280,814 280,814 654,892
No of subjects 74,284 74,284 139,340
No of failed 6,951 3,900 951
No. competing 22,265 25,316 44,879
Note: *Our main measure of PCM, dened as in equation (11). Year dummies included
as additional regressors. Firm-year clustered standard errors (probability levels) in round
(square) brackets.
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Table 12. Mobility Equations - Looking at the role of technical education
Multi to non-multi intra-industry destination state
Age -0.007 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
Gender -0.063 0.060
(0.095) (0.096)
Marital status 0.178 0.178*
(0.097) (0.097)
Parenthood status -0.173** -0.173**
(0.077) (0.077)
Education -0.094*** -0.095***
(0.026) (0.026)
Income -0.037 0.039
(0.055) (0.056)
Location -1.635*** -1.637***
(0.197) (0.197)
Log rm size 0.152*** 0.153***
(0.040) (0.040)
Prod gap 3-digit -0.846*** -0.716***
(0.095) (0.070)
Price-cost margin* 0.680*** 0.637***
(0.043) (0.044)
Technical education -0.004 0.109
(0.132) (0.109)
Prod gap*Techn edu 0.226*
(0.127)
PCM*Techn edu 0.071
(0.068)
Wald test of joint sign. 1,799.52 1,797.86
[0.00] [0.00]
Observations 280,814 280,814
No of subjects 74,284 74,284
No of failed 554 554
No. competing 28,662 28,662
Note: *Our main measure of PCM, dened as in equation (11).
Year dummies included as additional regressors. Firm-year clustered
standard errors (probability levels) in round (square) brackets.
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